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Abstract
We consider Hotelling location games with global and local players.
Global players are active in several markets, while local players act
in a single market only. The decisive feature is that global players
cannot tailor their product to each market but have to choose a location
on the Hotelling line that is valid for all markets in which they are
active. Obvious examples include the media industry and politics,
where competitors typically compete in several markets with basically
the same product. We determine equilibrium configurations for simple
specifications of such games. We then show that the presence of global
players tends to induce lower product diversity across markets. Finally,
when the number of firms is endogenous, we show how global players
may use their location choice as a preemptive device.
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1 Introduction
Motivation In this paper, we consider simple location games à la Hotelling
with two sorts of players: Global players are active in several markets, while
local players act in a single market only. The decisive feature is that global
players can choose only one position for their product. That is, they cannot
tailor their product to every individual market in which they are active.
Since these markets will in general differ with respect to salient characteris-
tics such as market size, the distribution of customers and the number and
type of competitors, optimal location choices will change non-trivially com-
pared to the standard case where all players are local. In particular, a global
player’s gain by changing his position in one market is typically (partially)
offset by a loss in another market as competitors will respond optimally to
any such change.
Two obvious fields of application for our theory are media markets and
politics: For example, in most countries, there are newspapers such as the
New York Times in the U.S., which are sold in many different regions or
local markets (e.g., on the East and the West Coast).1 While characteristics
such as size, the number of competitors, customer preferences are very likely
to differ across these local markets, the daily issue of the New York Times is
basically the same in New York as in Los Angeles. Thus, when the editors
decide to publish more articles about New York politics to attract more
readers in New York, this decision might result in a loss of customers on
the Los Angeles market, provided that these customers do not care as much
1Although a geographical interpretation is given to the term “market” in this and
subsequent examples, our arguments do not rely on it. One can equally plausibly think
of other criteria such as gender, age, or education level. For a newspaper, say, the group
of 35-40 year old females with high education levels might then be considered a different
“market” than the group of 55-60 year old males with low education levels. Nevertheless,
it might want to attract members of both groups with the same outlet, while it faces
competitors which are only targeting one of these groups.
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about New York politics as New Yorkers do.2 On the other hand, there are
outlets such as the New York Post or New York a.m., which are distributed
in New York only. These competitors are typically much smaller in size
and have a stronger focus on local issues, as their decisions about which
articles to publish are driven by considerations for this market only. A
similar argument holds for broadcasting markets, where large networks such
as CNN and Fox basically provide the same program across the U.S. (and
even to foreign countries), thereby competing against each other as well as
against smaller channels, which serve one regional or local market only.3
In politics, competition often takes place both on (possibly many differ-
ent) local levels and on a federal level. Again, these “markets” tend to be
highly heterogenous with respect to importance, voter preferences or voter
characteristics, as voters in jurisdictions with high average income, say, pre-
fer different tax policies than voters in jurisdictions with low average income.
Also here, there often seem to be two groups of parties involved: On the
one hand, there are big parties such as the Democrats or the Republicans
in the U.S., which compete on all levels. These are also global players in
our sense, as they cannot fully tailor their political views or decisions to
each market separately. For example, suppose Democrats leaders announce
that, should the party win the federal elections, taxes will be raised to in-
crease redistribution. Then presumably, on a local election level, it would
2Sometimes nationwide outlets have so-called “local windows” in which a limited num-
ber of pages contain articles which are tailored towards the relevant local market. We will
discuss this issue in section 6 below.
3In fact, it seems that program choices are truly interdependent as the following quo-
tation suggests: “Well, Fox has had a profound impact on cable television not only be-
cause it is, I guess, the No. 1 watched program of cable television stations out there,
even though they don’t have as many stations as CNN, but they’ve also forced the other
cable television stations to put on more conservative hosts and pay attention to the con-
servative market out there. So the other cable televisions are more conservative today
because of Fox.” R. Viguerie, co-author of “America‘s right turn: how conservatives
used new and alternative media to take power” (quotation taken from an interview at
http://www.booknotes.org/transcript/?ProgramID=1796).
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be hardly convincing to argue in favor of tax cuts to gain votes in a high av-
erage income jurisdiction. On the other hand, there are often small parties
or political groups which compete only in a subset of jurisdictions.
Framework and main results In this paper we set up a simple
model which reflects many common features of the above-mentioned ex-
amples: Global players compete in several markets against different local
competitors, and markets differ with respect to size and distribution of cus-
tomers. We characterize equilibrium configurations and compare them to
the standard model where all players are local, such that markets are not
“connected” through the location choices of global players.
Apart from characterizing equilibrium configurations of such location
games, we are concerned with the resulting degree of diversity within and
across markets. As for media markets in Germany and Switzerland, say,
many people argue that there seems to exist a (too) great degree of product
homogeneity not only within but even across regional markets, despite dif-
ferences in taste of consumers and an increasing number of suppliers.4 While
it is a well-known feature of many Hotelling location games that firms clus-
ter at the median position of the distribution of customers, thereby inducing
full product homogeneity (or zero diversity) within a market, we argue that
the presence of global players can help to explain why product diversity is
low also across markets. The basic mechanism at work is that the concern
of a global player to cater customers preferences in all markets induces him
to move towards a “weighted average” of all relevant markets. In turn,
the best response of a local competitor is to locate adjacently to the global
player. This brings the equilibrium configuration closer together compared
to the case where all players are local and where markets are separated. As
4See, e.g., NZZ (2003), Spiegel online (2003), or Weltwoche (2005).
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a result, diversity across markets decreases.
So as to compare different equilibrium outcomes, we develop a crite-
rion based on the preference costs of consumers. With respect to diversity
within markets (“local diversity”), we show that clustering is suboptimal
in terms of minimization of preferences costs. Moreover, within the class of
configurations with clustering, we show that doing so at the median position
would lead to the lowest preference costs. This criterion allows us the com-
pare welfare in equilibrium outcomes where clustering occurs at different
positions.
We then analyze three extensions to the basic model: First, we allow
for entry, where each firm has to incur a cost when entering a market. We
show how preemption may become an important additional aspect for an
incumbent global player when deciding on where to locate. Second, we
extend the basic model to a case with two global players where each of them
competes with a local competitor on his “home market”, but where they
additionally compete directly against each other on a third market. Finally,
while for the above-mentioned examples, price competition seems to play
only a minor role, we illustrate how our approach could be set in relation
to a model à la Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001), where media firms
compete in prices for readers and for revenue from selling advertisement
space. We give a sufficient condition such that equilibrium prices are zero for
all locations because of the intensity of the competition for advertisements.
In these situations, our approach could be viewed as a reduced form of such
a model, thereby justifying our abstracting from price competition in the
basic model.
Relation to the Literature To the best of our knowledge, the issue
of global players has not yet been addressed in the literature so far. However,
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our modelling approach is clearly in the tradition of the large literature on
horizontal differentiation starting with Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957).
In this literature, as in our paper, a major topic has also been the degree
of product diversity resulting in equilibrium. Starting from Hotelling’s fa-
mous “Principle of Minimum Differentiation” derived from a simple location
model without price competition as ours, it has been enquired under which
circumstance the claim is correct (see, e.g., d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and
Thisse (1979), Osborne and Pitchik (1987), and Irmen and Thisse (1998)
and, in the context of political competition, the survey by Osborne (1995)).
In the context of media markets, Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001)
analyze a model where apart from location choices and prices, firms also com-
pete for receipts from selling advertisement space in their outlets. Contrary
to our basic model, since firms also compete in prices and customers face
quadratic preference costs, their benchmark model without advertisement
receipts involves maximum differentiation (as was shown by d’Aspremont,
Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979)). Including advertisement receipts, they
show that the new equilibrium may now induce clustering, thereby reducing
the degree of diversity to zero. Along these lines, our contribution is that we
identify an additional channel through which clustering may occur, namely
the interaction of global and local players.
Finally, the relationship between the socially optimal level of diversity
and the equilibrium level is discussed by Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2002)
in a “circular city” - model à la Salop (1979).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the
basic model is introduced, and in section 3 we derive the equilibrium con-
figurations for our basic model and compare it to a benchmark where all
players are local. The issue of diversity is discussed in section 4. In Section
5
5 we consider the three extensions of the basic model, while in section 6 we
discuss our results and conclude. All proofs are delegated to the appendix.
2 The basic model
We analyze a Hotelling location model in which competition takes place in
two markets k = A,B. There are two types of players: local players are
active in one market only, while global players are active in both markets.
As outlined above, the decisive feature is that the location choice of a global
player is necessarily the same for all markets in which he operates.
There is a unit mass of consumers in each market k which are distributed
on the unit interval according to a continuous distribution function Fk with
density F ′k and with full support. The median of each Fk is denoted mk and
implicitly given by Fk(mk) = 12 . All distributions are common knowledge.
Each individual consumes one unit of the good from the closest provider.
There is no price competition.5
As for firms’ payoff, different markets will in general be of different size
and importance to firms. Let sk measure the market size or importance of
market k. Thus, sA > sB means that capturing a customer in market A is
more valuable for a firm than in market B. In media markets, for example,
sk might depend on the number of people living in one market place and
their average income since these factors constitute the advertisement value
of a firm’s product.6 In politics, sk would measure the number of seats of a
district or state. For the moment, we assume that the number of competitors
is fixed.7 Therefore since consumers have unit demand, in each market k
each firm’s revenue is equal to the number of customers it attracts times the
5See section 5.3.
6Getting a one percent market share in a large metropolitan area might be more valu-
able than getting half the market in a small rural area.
7This assumption is relaxed in section 5.1
6
market potential sk.
Concerning the timing of the game, we follow Prescott and Visscher
(1977), Neven (1987) and Anderson and Engers (2001) and assume that
location choices occur sequentially. The order of moves is exogenously given
and global players are assumed to move first. We believe that thinking of
global players choosing their location before local players is reasonable, as in
most examples we have in mind, they have been active long before the advent
of their local competitors. In addition, from a technical point of view, this
assumption ensures the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore,
we also assume that, once a location choice has been made, it is prohibitively
costly to move to another location. As Prescott and Visscher (1977) have
argued, such costs might for example be pure physical re-location costs, or
advertisement costs to change the perception of the firm in the mind of its
customers when it is at a new location of the spectrum. This implies that
there is no commitment problem for global players as they never find it
profitable to change their location ex post, after local players have chosen
their location.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Benchmark: Separated Hotelling markets
As a natural benchmark we first consider the case with local players only
in which case the two markets are separated from each other. In partic-
ular, suppose that in each market k there are two local players and that,
respectively, player 1, say, moves first, and then player 2. Prescott and Viss-
cher (1977, pp.381) have shown that in such a framework, whether players
move sequentially or simultaneously does not affect the equilibrium out-
come. Therefore, this benchmark is trivial to analyze as it is equivalent to
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the simple standard model of spatial competition.
Denote by lki the location choice of player i in market k, where i = 1, 2.
It then follows that in each market the best response of player 2 as a function
of the location choice of player 1, denoted by l∗k2(lk1) is given by
l∗k2(lk1) =



l−k1 if lk1 > mk
lk1 if lk1 = mk
l+k1 if lk1 < mk
(1)
where l−k1 := lk1 − ε and l+k1 := lk1 + ε and where ε is an arbitrarily small
positive number. In words, if lk1 is to the left of the median of Fk, then it is
optimal for player 1 to position just to the right of player 2 and vice versa.
Finding the optimal choice for player 1 and denoting equilibrium out-
comes with a “*”, this leads immediately to the well-known result that in
each market, firms cluster at the median position:
Proposition 1 (Hotelling, Prescott-Visscher). On each market k =
A,B, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome both players locate
at the median position, i.e., l∗k1 = l
∗
k2 = mk.
Intuitively, as in the standard Hotelling game with simultaneous moves,
player 1 anticipates that wherever he locates, player 2 will always locate
adjacently towards that side of the [0, 1]-interval which has the larger number
of consumers (the “long side”). It follows that player 1’s optimal location
is where the remaining “short side” is maximized which is at the median
position (see Figure 1).
Note that unless mA = mB, the equilibrium locations will be different
across markets. As will become clear below, the introduction of global play-
ers is only of interest when the medians of the respective distributions are
different. Otherwise, the best response for a player in market A would be
the same as in market in B and this would also hold if he is a global player
who is active in these two markets.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in the benchmark.
3.2 From local to global competition
In our analysis of games with global players, we consider the simplest case
where one global player competes in both markets against one local player,
respectively. The location choice of the local player in market k = A,B and
the global player are denoted by lk and g, respectively.
We solve this game backwards by first determining the best response for
a local player in market k = A,B as a function of the location choice g of
the global player which is given by:
l∗k(g) =



g− if g > mk
g if g = mk
g+ if g < mk
(2)
where g− := g − ε and g+ := g + ε.
Given these best responses, we can then state the following preliminary
result concerning the optimal location choice g∗ of the global player:
Lemma 1. On each market k = A, B, g∗ < mk only if m−k < mk. It
then follows that in any equilibrium mB ≤ g∗ ≤ mA if mA > mB and
mA ≤ g∗ ≤ mB if mA < mB.
Thus, the global player will only depart from his preferred position in
market A, say, when thereby gaining customers in market B. Given the best
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response of his local competitor there, this is only possible when moving
towards mB. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1. i) mA > mB
ii) F ′′A < 0 and F
′′
B > 0
iii) sA · F ′A(mB)− sB · F ′B(mB) > 0 and sA · F ′A(mA)− sB · F ′B(mA) < 0
The first part of the assumption is without loss of generality and simply
limits the number of cases we have to consider, while the analysis of the
omitted cases is completely analogous. Parts ii) and iii) ensure an interior
solution to the maximization problem of the global player as moving away
from a median becomes increasing costly. For market A (B), the relevant
direction of deviation is to the left (right) and thus the concavity (convexity)
of FA (FB) ensures that this is the case. Part iii) simply says that the
marginal benefit from moving to the right at g = mB (g = mA) is positive
(negative).
Using Lemma 1, it follows that the local players’ relevant best responses
are l∗A = g
∗+ > g∗ and l∗B = g
∗− < g∗ so that the global player’s profit as a
function of g can be written as:
Π(g) = sA · FA(g) + sB · (1− FB(g)) ∀g ∈ [mB,mA] (3)
That is, the global player captures all customers to the left of his com-
petitor in market A and those to the right in market B. Assumption 1 ensures
that this function achieves its unique maximum at g∗, where the following
first order condition is satisfied:
sA · F ′A(g∗) = sB · F ′B(g∗) (4)
This condition simply says that the marginal gain from moving closer
towards mA and getting more customers there, weighted by sA (measuring
10
Figure 2: Equilibrium with a global player
the importance of market A) must equal the marginal loss from moving
further away from mB, thereby losing customers there. This leads to the
following result:
Proposition 2. With one global player competing with one local player on
each market A and B, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is {g =
g∗, l∗A = g
∗+, l∗B = g
∗−}, where g∗ is implicitly given by Eqn. (4).
As can be seen from Figure 2, there is still clustering in equilibrium, but
it does no longer occur at the median positions in each market. Instead,
both markets are “tied” together through the presence of the global player.
In the following section, we will discuss in more detail what this means
in terms of diversity. But it is already clear that as a consequence of the
introduction of a global player, all firms are located at the same position in
both markets despite the fact that mA 6= mB.
Furthermore, it is also intuitively clear how the relative importance of
the different markets affects the equilibrium location choice of the global
player. Applying the implicit function theorem it can easily be shown that
g∗ is more (less) distorted from mA when market B (A) is more important,
i.e., we have dg
∗
dsB
< 0 and dg
∗
dsA
> 0.
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For instance, with respect to the case of media markets, our analy-
sis might suggest that the currently observed trend towards more product
homogeneity does not necessarily mean that these strategies are targeted
towards the median consumer in a certain market, but rather towards a
“weighted average” of consumers of all markets in which firms are active.
4 Diversity
We now analyze the impact of global players on the degree of diversity and
on total preference costs resulting in equilibrium and compare them to the
benchmark where all players are local. Let yk and yk denote the respective
maximum and minimum location choices in market k. We introduce the
following two measures:
Definition 1. We refer to
i) “local diversity” as the spread of location choices within each market
k = A,B, i.e., LDk := yk − yk.
ii) “global diversity” as the maximum spread of location choices across mar-
kets, i.e., GD := maxk{yk} −mink{yk}.
Instead of simply claiming that “more diversity is good”, we derive the
desirability of diversity endogenously from the minimization of preference (or
transportation) costs consumers incur when buying from a provider whose
location is different from their own. For simplicity, we normalize these costs
to 1 per distance unit. That is, the preference costs for a consumer at
x ∈ [0, 1] when consuming the product from a provider at y ∈ [0, 1] is simply
|x− y|. Let LPCk(yk1, yk2) denote the aggregate preference costs in market
k when firms locate at positions yk1, yk2 ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Moreover,
define GPC :=
∑
k LPCk as total preference costs across both markets.
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With two players on each market, the first best location choices are
denoted {yfk1, yfk2} and minimize LPCk. Assuming yfk1 ≥ yfk2 without loss
of generality, we therefore have
{yfk1, yfk2} ∈ arg minyk1,yk2 LPCk(yk1, yk2)
=
∫ yk1+yk2
2
0
|yk2 − x|F ′k(x)dx +
∫ 1
yk1+yk2
2
|yk1 − x|F ′k(x)dx(5)
where the first term of the expression gives the preference costs for all cus-
tomers buying from firm 1 (i.e., those for which firm 1 is the nearest firm).
Analogously, the second expression refers to the preference costs of cus-
tomers buying from firm 2. The level of local diversity minimizing preference
cost is then given by LDfK = y
f
k1 − yfk2 and the following result holds:
Lemma 2. i) Minimization of preference costs in market k involves a pos-
itive amount of local diversity, i.e., LDfk > 0 and thus clustering is not
optimal.
ii) Given that clustering occurs in equilibrium in market k, i.e., y∗1k = y
∗
2k =
y, so that LD∗k = 0, preference costs are lowest if firms cluster at y = mk.
This result says that, given that clustering occurs in equilibrium, from a
preference cost minimizing point of view, firms should cluster at the median
mk. However, preference costs would be further decreased by generating a
positive degree of local diversity around mk so that at the first best location
choices there will be some local diversity. Note however, that it does not
follow from Lemma 2 that any degree of local diversity is better in terms of
preference costs than clustering. The result is useful because it allows us to
compare equilibrium outcomes in which clustering occurs in both markets,
but at different locations:
Corollary 1. While LDk = 0 for all k = A,B in both models, with and
without global players, global diversity is strictly lower and total preference
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costs are strictly higher in the model with a global player compared to the
benchmark.
Intuitively, for the benchmark case, we know from Proposition 1 that
clustering occurs at the median of each market, and so in terms of preference
costs, the ”second best” outcome is achieved. As for global diversity, given
Assumption 1, we have GD = mA −mB > 0.
For the case with the global player, from Proposition 2 we know that
there is still clustering in each market, but it does no longer occur at the
medians mA and mB. Therefore, it immediately follows that global diversity
goes down. Moreover, Lemma 2 nicely allows to compare different cluster-
ing equilibria with respect to the preference costs they generate: Not only
is clustering socially inefficient, but if it does not occur at the median lo-
cation, then it is even worse. Note also that in this case, the reduction in
global diversity comes together with an increase in total preference costs,
because preference costs in each individual market are higher than in the
benchmark case. However, as will become clear in section 5.2, it cannot gen-
erally be concluded that the introduction of global players leads to higher
total preference costs compared to the benchmark case where all players are
local.
5 Extensions
In this section we extend the basic model and consider i) the case of entry,
ii) a setup with more than one global player, and iii) competition in prices.
We address each issue in turn.
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5.1 Entry and preemption
We have so far not addressed the case when a global player faces competition
from both sides in each market, i.e., if there is potentially more than one
local competitor on each market.
To study such a situation with entry, we extend the basic model of
section 3.2 and consider first the case where markets are small such that, in
equilibrium, at most one local firm enters in each market. We then derive
the conditions under which the global player is able to simultaneously deter
entry in both markets or in one market only. Finally, we discuss the case of
larger markets, where more than one local player will enter in equilibrium.
5.1.1 Preliminaries
We assume now that the global player faces potential competition from
sequentially entering local firms in each of its relevant markets, A and B,
and as before, the global player moves first.
Let T denote the fixed cost of operation for a local player, which is
assumed to be the same in each market. Then, αk := T/sk is the market
share a local player needs to capture in market k in order to break even.
Neglecting integer constraints, the maximal number of local players entering
market k in equilibrium will be 1/αk. In contrast to local players, the global
player does not necessarily have to obtain a share of αk in each market in
order to break even, since the fixed cost when operating in both markets
will, in general, be smaller than 2T . For simplicity, we set it to zero so that
he is always willing to enter both markets.8
When distributions are not uniform, one has to distinguish between lo-
8Of course in reality, global players are also likely to face a cost when entering a certain
market such as opening a sales office. All we need, however, is that these costs are lower
than for a local competitor who does not already have a ready-made product.
15
cations and market shares. For this purpose, we generalize the method
proposed by Prescott and Visscher (1977) and define the function λk(x, αk)
which is the location that leaves a market share of 2αk between itself and
the next competitor to the left located at some x > 0. That is, λk is such
that Fk(λk) := 2αk + Fk(x). Since in equilibrium, no firm will ever locate
at x = 0,
λk(0) := F−1k (αk) (6)
gives the largest position on the Hotelling line a firm can take such that there
is no subsequent entry to its left. Analogously, let ρk(x, αk) be the location
that generates a market share of 2αk when the closest competitor is located
at x < 1 to its right. That is, ρk(x, αk) is such that Fk(x)− Fk(ρk) := 2αk.
Also, as for the right corner, the smallest position a local player can take
without inducing subsequent entry to its right is then given by
ρk(1) := F−1k (1− αk) . (7)
5.1.2 Small markets
Let us assume first that 12 < αk < 1 for k = A,B, i.e., that markets are
small so that in any equilibrium, at most one local player will enter market
k. Note that αk > 12 implies ρk(1) < λk(0) so that for the global player,
any choice g ∈ [ρk(1), λk(0)] would deter entry in k, while any other choice
would not, since g < ρk(1) (g > λk(0)) would induce entry to his right (left).
Consider first the case depicted in Figure 3, in which there is an overlap
of the two intervals for which a local firm would enter in each market, should
the global player locate outside this interval. Then, the global player can
forestall entry in both markets by choosing any location in the overlapping
interval [ρA(1), λB(0)], because no potential entrant would then be able to
get a market share of αk. Clearly, this is what the global player will do in
16
Figure 3: Global player can deter entry in both markets.
Figure 4: Global player can deter entry only in one market.
equilibrium and his payoff is then sA + sB.
Next, assume that there is no overlap, which is, e.g., the case if λB(0) <
ρA(1), as shown in Figure 4. In this case, whenever the global firm chooses to
forestall entry in market k, which it can do only by locating in [ρk(1), λk(0)],
then it necessarily opens the way to entry in market −k. Finally, by locating
in one of the intervals [0, ρB(1)], [λB(0), ρA(1)], or [λA(0), 1], the global
player invites entry in both markets. We analyze each of these three cases
in turn:
Preempting entry in market A Note first, that for any choice of the
global player which prevents entry in market A (i.e., g ∈ [ρA(1), λB(0)]), the
best response of the first local player in market B is to choose l∗B = λB(0),
i.e., to move as closely to the global player’s position as possible without
leaving too big a gap to its left, which would induce a second local firm to
17
enter in market B. For the global player this means that he strictly prefers to
choose g∗ = ρA(1), i.e., the smallest location that prevents entry in market A
and maximizes his share in market B. It follows that the equilibrium payoff
of the global player is
Π(g∗) = sA + sB · (1− FB(λB(0) + ρA(1)2 )) (8)
for g∗ = ρA(1). Obviously, Π(g∗) ≥ sA.
Preempting entry in market B This case is completely analogous:
Given any g ∈ [ρB(1), λB(0)] to deter entry in market B, the first local
player in market A will locate at ρA(1) thereby preventing further entry.
In turn, the best response for the global player is to locate at g∗ = λB(0),
which yields an equilibrium payoff of
Π(g∗) = sA · FA(λB(0) + ρA(1)2 ) + sB. (9)
Clearly, for g∗ = λB(0), Π(g∗) ≥ sB.
Thus, when deterring entry in one market in an optimal way, the payoff
to the global player is at least max[sA, sB].
Accommodating entry in both markets We focus on the case g ∈
(λB(0), ρA(1)).9 The first local player will choose his location to maximize
his respective market share, while making sure that no further entry occurs.
Thus, we have l∗A = ρA(1) and l
∗
B = λB(0). It follows that the payoff for the
global player is
Π(g) = sA · FA(g + ρA(1)2 ) + sB · (1− FB(
λB(0) + g
2
)). (10)
Note that FA(
g+ρA(1)
2 ) ≤ 1 − αA < 12 and 1 − FB(λB(0)+g2 ) ≤ 1 − αB < 12 .
Hence, the maximal payoff of accommodating entry in both markets is no
9All arguments for the cases g < ρB(1) and g > λA(0) are analogous.
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larger than sA(1−αA)+sB(1−αB) < 12(sA +sB), which is strictly less than
the minimal profit of optimally deterring entry in one market, max[sA, sB].
This leads immediately to the following result:
Proposition 3. When the global player cannot preempt entry in both mar-
kets, then
i) it is never optimal for him to allow entry in both markets.
Assume λB(0) < ρA(1). Then
ii) the global player prefers to prevent entry in market A (B), thereby ac-
commodating entry in market B (A) if
sA · (1− FA(λB(0) + ρA(1)2 )) ≷ sB · FB(
λB(0) + ρA(1)
2
). (11)
The second part of the proposition follows by comparing (9) and (10).
Intuitively, the global player has always the option to monopolize at least
one market. The result shows that he strictly prefers to do so to locating “in
the middle”, thereby allowing entry in both markets. Whether it is optimal
to allow entry in market A or B depends on the relative importance of both
markets and the distributions of customers.
5.1.3 Large markets
It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case of larger markets in
which more than one local player will enter in equilibrium. Consider for
example the case 13 < αk <
1
2 so that λk(0) < mk < ρk(1). When, say,
locating to the left of λk(0), the global player invites one subsequent entrant
(at l∗k = ρk(1)), while when locating inside the interval (λk(0), ρk(1)), two
local players enter, one at λk(0) and one at ρk(1). Hence, the global player
gets “hit” from both sides. Although his optimal choice will depend on the
characteristics of market −k as well, it follows that there is a strong incen-
tive for the global player to avoid locating inside the interval (λk(0), ρk(1)).
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Thus, since the global player needs a smaller market share in any local mar-
ket than local firms in order to break even, the global player can behave
more aggressively than local players can.
Finally, with respect to diversity, we observe that the tendency towards
clustering (or product homogeneity) is weakened when there is entry. Speak-
ing somewhat loosely, the reason is that to preempt subsequent entry, firms
have to leave gaps no larger than αk to the closest end of the unit inter-
val and no larger than 2αk between themselves. On the other hand, these
gaps may not be too small either because otherwise the firms would not
cover the fix cost T > 0. Thus, one would expect that the issue of diver-
sity is less problematic when the threat of entry is virulent than when it
is not. This seems consistent with the observation that excessive product
homogeneity seems to be particularly prevalent in radio and TV markets,
where the threat of entry is rather weak whenever there exists only a limited
number of available licenses.
5.2 Two global players in three markets
As a further extension, we now consider the case of two global players,
labelled GA and GB, where each of them is competing against one local
player in a “home market” (A and B for GA and GB, respectively). In
addition, both global players are competing directly against each other on
a third market C. Denote the location choices by the global players by gA
and gB, and those of the local players by lA and lB, respectively.
Note first that the best responses LA and LB are still given by
l∗A(gA) =



g−A if gA > mA
gA if gA = mA
g+A if gA < mA
(12)
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and
l∗B(gB) =



g−B if gB > mB
gB if gB = mB
g+B if gB < mB
(13)
To determine the equilibrium configuration, the following preliminary
result is crucial:
Lemma 3. Given mB < mA by Assumption 1, min(mB,mC) ≤ g∗B ≤ g∗A ≤
max(mA,mC) holds in any pure strategy equilibrium.
Thus, the mere fact that mA > mB implies that, in equilibrium, GA
(whose home market is A) will always locate to the right of GB (whose
home market is B), independent of the characteristics of market C.
Although we know that in equilibrium, GA will always locate to the right
of GB, the equilibrium payoffs and the exact equilibrium configuration will
depend on the relative position of the medians. As in the basic model, to
limit the number of cases to consider, we make the following assumption in
addition to Assumption 1:
Assumption 2. i) FC is uniform so that mC = 12 and F
′′
C = 0
ii) mB < mC = 12 < mA
Given this Assumption it then follows from Lemma 3 that g∗A < mA and
g∗B > mB must hold so that the payoff for the global players are given by
ΠGA(gA, gB) = sA · FA(gA) + sC · (1− FC(
gA + gB
2
)) (14)
and
ΠGB(gA, gB) = sB · (1− FB(gB)) + sC · FC(
gA + gB
2
) (15)
Thus, GA serves all customers to the left of gA in market A (and LA
chooses l∗A = g
+
A thereby serving all customers to the right of gA). In market
C, GA serves all customers to the right of gA plus all customers to the left
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Figure 5: Equilibrium with two global players and three markets.
between the middle of gA and gB (which is at gA+gB2 ) and gA, because GA
is the closest firm for these. An analogous interpretation holds for GB
Again, our assumptions ensure interior solutions for the equilibrium loca-
tion choices g∗A and g
∗
B, which, when taking into account that FC is uniform,
are then implicitly given by the following first order conditions:
sA · F ′A(gA)−
sC
2
= 0 (16)
−sB · F ′B(gB) +
sC
2
= 0 (17)
Summarizing, we have the following result:
Proposition 4. In the model with two global players and three markets, the
subgame perfect equilibrium location choices are {gA = g∗A, gB = g∗B, l∗A =
g∗+A , l
∗
B = g
∗−
B }, where g∗A and g∗B are implicitly given by Eqn. (16) and
(17).
The result is illustrated in Figure 5. Invoking again the implicit function
theorem, it is straightforward to show that g∗A is increasing in sA and de-
creasing in sC . Intuitively, a higher sC , say, makes market C more attractive
for GA, so that he becomes more willing to sacrifice customers in market A
to attract more customers in market C. Analogously, g∗B is decreasing in sB
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and increasing in sC . Finally, note that since g∗A is decreasing in sC and g
∗
B
is increasing in sC , the difference g∗A − g∗B is decreasing in sC . That is, the
less important is market C, the more do GA and GB prefer to locate near
the median of their respective “home” market.
In terms of diversity, note from Figure 5 that we have clustering in
markets A and B, but not in market C. This means that preference costs
in markets A and B are strictly higher compared to the benchmark (this
follows from Lemma 2). However in market C, since there is no clustering,
preference costs can be lower compared to the benchmark. If this effect is
sufficiently strong, then it can be easily shown that both global diversity
and preference costs may decrease compared to the benchmark case.
5.3 Advertising and price competition in a two-sided market
So far, we have assumed that firms compete for customers via locations but
not in prices. Arguing along the lines of Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac
(2001), we now show that a model where firms (like, e.g., newspapers, broad-
casting companies, internet platforms or political parties) compete for cus-
tomers by location choice only can be viewed as a reduced form of a two-sided
market model in which firms first compete for customers and then for adver-
tisers. The basic idea is that if customers are sensitive to price differences
and if advertising revenue is sufficiently important, then price competition
for customers is degenerate, so that the equilibrium prices charged to con-
sumers are zero and competition takes place via locations only. Because we
want to allow for more general distributions of customers, we slightly extend
Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001) to general distribution functions.
In their model, two newspapers i = 1, 2 compete on a single market,10
10Once the case with a single market has been laid out, the extension to the multi-market
case is immediate.
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where customers are distributed between [0,1] according to a distribution
function F (·). Note that it is immaterial whether firms are local and global
players. For our analysis to be correct, it is only required that global firms
can in general set different prices in different markets. Firms first choose a
location xi ∈ [0, 1], then set a price pi ≥ 0 when competing for readers, and
finally set a fee σi ≥ 0 for advertisers. Since all else equal, advertisers prefer
newspapers with more readers, this is a two-sided market with externalities,
as, e.g., analyzed by Armstrong (2004).
An advertiser’s net valuations when placing an add in newspaper i with
di readers and fee σi is θdi−σi, where θ measures an advertiser’s gross valu-
ation and is uniformly distributed on [0,1] with density 4γ. If an advertiser
θ places an add in both newspapers, his net utility is θd1 − σ2 + θd2 − σ2.
It follows that type θ̃i := σi/di is indifferent between advertising and not
advertising in newspaper i, while all θ > θ̃i strictly prefer to do so. Thus,
the demand for advertisement which i faces is 4γ(1 − σidi ), so that the fee
which maximizes advertising revenue is σ∗i = di/2 and maximal revenue is
γdi.
Next, assume for simplicity that readers do not care about the number
of adds in a newspaper and, without loss of generality, assume x1 ≤ x2.
Moreover, let the transportation cost be quadratic in the distance travelled,
so that reader x̃ ∈ [x1, x2] is indifferent between buying from 1 and 2 if
and only if −t(x̃− x1)2 − p1 = −t(x̃− x2)2 − p2, where t ≥ 0 measures the
ease with which readers switch from one newspaper to another. Thus, if
x̃ ∈ [x1, x2] exists, x̃ = x1+x22 + p2−p12t(x2−x1) is indifferent, so that newspapers 1
and 2 face demands d1(p1, p2) = F (x̃) and d2(p1, p2) = 1−F (x̃), respectively.
Otherwise, demand for one firm is zero and one for the other one. Given
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locations x1, x2, i’s profit when setting prices thus is
Πi(p1, p2) = (pi + γ)di(p1, p2). (18)
Rather than characterizing the price equilibria for all conceivable distri-
bution functions, parameter configurations and locations, we now derive a
simple sufficient condition such that the equilibrium prices are zero for any
location choices. From the corresponding first order condition for Eqn. (18),
such a condition can be derived as
γ
2t
≥ 1
minx f(x)
. (19)
Under standard regularity assumptions on F (·) such as full support, the
right hand side is finite, and the condition is always satisfied for γ sufficiently
large or t sufficiently small. Thus, our modelling approach can be viewed as
a reduced form of a game in which the price paid by customers is not the
primary source of revenue. Indeed, this seems to be a realistic feature of
many media markets.
6 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze location
games in which a subset of players compete on several markets with the
same product, a feature frequently observed in reality. We have shown how
the equilibria of such games differ from the standard Hotelling game and that
global players tend to induce lower degrees of diversity across markets. If one
accepts the common view that one aspect of globalization is that it has lead
to more market integration (e.g., through international expansion strategies
or mergers), our results seem much in line with the frequently observed (and
lamented) trend towards more product homogeneity in markets such as the
media industry, for which our model seems most appropriate.
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We would now like to discuss some of our assumptions and suggest direc-
tions in which the analysis could be further extended. As mentioned in the
introduction, the products of global players are sometimes not fully identical
throughout markets, but some product differentiation is achieved through
so-called “local windows”. For example, newspapers often have local sec-
tions where mainly local topics are covered. Such local windows can easily
be incorporated in our model without affecting qualitatively our results as
long as at least part of the product remains “global”.
This brings us to the question why there are global players in the first
place. That is, why does the New York Times not increase the size of its local
windows so that in fact, it would publish completely different newspapers in
New York and Los Angeles? One might think of the basic model with one
global player (see section 3.2) as arising from the benchmark case through a
merger of two local firms. It can then be easily seen that the global player
would be less profitable than two separate local firms: Local firms earn 12sk
in each market, so that an owner who runs both firms separately in each
market would earn 12sA +
1
2sB, while when running them as a global player,
he would only earn sA · FA(g∗) + sB · (1 − FB(g∗)) which is strictly less as
local competitors now capture more than half of each market. Thus, the
emergence of global players cannot be explained endogenously within our
model and other reasons for this phenomenon such as returns to scale might
be the key factors (see Anderson and de Palma (2000)).
An interesting question to be addressed in future work arises in areas
where a government has the power to define markets, which is, e.g., the case
when issuing radio or TV licences for different regions such as metropoli-
tan areas. Assume that metropolitan areas differ with respect to consumer
tastes and market size and that, as seems reasonable, the objective of the
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government is to minimize consumer preference costs. Then, should mar-
kets be defined narrowly or broadly, i.e., should a license be given for each
metropolitan area alone or should several areas be bundled into a single
license? And if bundling is optimal, should one bundle similar or rather
different markets into one license? The answer obviously depends on the
number and the scope of applicants, which in turn depend on the scope
and number of licences, giving rise to a new game. In this game, govern-
ment and applicants for a license anticipate that players with a license will
choose locations along the lines of the present paper, but also the number
and scope of applicants for a license depends on the number and scope of
licenses chosen by government.
A further extension aims at providing empirical support for the predic-
tions derived in the model. For example, we would expect the content of
the New York Times to respond to significant changes in its competitive
environment such as its own expanding into a new market or the advent
of new, strong competitors in one or several of its relevant markets. De-
pending on the political orientation of its new competitors, one reasonable
measure would be the number of articles published on more liberal topics
such as health or family issues as compared to more conservative topics such
as defense or crime. For that purpose, we have access to an article database
containing more than 36,000 articles published in the New York Times since
1946 with detailed information, for example, on the topic of the article and
whether its content is of local or broader interest.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
If there were no other markets to consider for the global player then we
know from Proposition 1 that he would locate at mk in equilibrium. Thus,
he is willing to depart from this location only if this increases his profit in
market −k. However, given the best responses of his local competitors, he
can increase his profit in market −k only if he moves towards the median of
F−k.
B Proof of Lemma 2
It is instructive to begin with part ii): Given that both firms cluster at some
point y ∈ [0, 1], preference costs in market k are given by
LPCk(y) =
∫ y
0
(y − x)F ′k(x)dx +
∫ 1
y
(x− y)F ′k(x)dx
which has to be minimized with respect to y. The first order condition is
given by
∫ y
0
F ′k(x)dx + (y − y)F ′k(y) =
∫ 1
y
F ′k(x)dx + (y − y)F ′k(y) ⇔
∫ y
0
F ′k(x)dx =
∫ 1
y
F ′k(x)dx
and clearly, the solution is at y = mk where both integrals are equal to 12 .
Moreover, the second order condition is satisfied as
∂2
∂y2
PCk(·) = F ′k(y) + F ′k(y) > 0
so that the objective function is strictly convex for all y ∈ (0, 1) and the
solution is unique.
Part i): Assume to the contrary that total preference costs are minimized
if both locate at the median position, i.e., if y1 = y2 = mk. But because the
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distribution is non-degenerate, this cannot be a minimum. To see this, let
only firm 1 change his position to either y+ or y−. Because all who previously
went to y can still do so, all customers who want to can still do so. But
because either the interval [0,mk) or the interval (mk, 1] contains a positive
measure of customers, these will prefer to go to firm 1 if y1 = y−(y+) because
this firm is closer. Therefore, total preference costs cannot be minimized
with clustering.
C Proof of Lemma 3
We first prove min(mB,mC) ≤ g∗B, g∗A ≤ max(mA,mC). Since the proof
for min(mB,mC) ≤ g∗B, g∗A is analogous, it suffices to show that g∗B, g∗A ≤
max(mA,mC). For that purpose, assume first that gB > max(mA,mC).
In this case, the best response of GA is to locate to the left of gB since
by doing so his profits increase on both markets A and C. If GA’s best
response is such that gA > max(mA,mC), GB’s best response will be to
locate at gB < gA since by doing so his profits increase both in market B and
C. Either gB > max(mA,mC), in which case the same chain of arguments
begins anew, or gB < max(mA,mC). But if gB ≤ max(mA,mC), the best
response of GA will be gA ≤ max(mA,mC) because doing so increases his
profits in both markets. Thus, we have shown that in any pure strategy
equilibrium g∗B, g
∗
A ≤ max(mA,mC) and by analogy min(mB,mC) ≤ g∗B, g∗A,
and we are left to show g∗B ≤ g∗A, which we do by contradiction. There are
three cases to be distinguished, given that mB < mA by Assumption 1.
Case 1: mB < mC < mA. If mB < gA < gB < mC < mA, GA
can increase profits in both markets relevant to him by moving to the right
of gB. Similarly, when mB < mC < gA < gB < mA, GB can increase
his profits in both markets B and C by moving to the left of gA. When
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mB < gA < mC < gB < mA, then GA could increase his payoff in both
markets by moving to the right, (weakly) beyond mC and as closely as
possible near GB. In the neighborhood of gB at g−B , he would not prefer to
surpass GB because this would give a discontinuous loss in market C and
only a marginal gain in market A. But for any mC ≤ gA < gB < mA, we
have already shown that GB would strictly prefer to locate at gB ≤ gA as
he would gain in both relevant markets. Thus, g∗B ≤ g∗A has been shown for
case 1.
Case 2: mC < mB < mA. When mC < gA < gB < mB < mA, then
GA has an incentive to move as closely to the left of GB as he gains in both
relevant markets. But when gA = g−B , then GB has an incentive to locate to
the left of GA at g−A since this would give him a discontinuous gain in market
C and only a marginal loss in market B. When mC < gA < mB < gB < mA,
then, again, GA prefers to locate at gA = g−B . But then, GB can gain in
both markets by choosing gB = g−A . When mC < mB < gA < gB < mA,
then GB can gain in both markets by moving to the left of GA. Therefore,
we have shown g∗B ≤ g∗A for case 2.
Case 3: mB < mA < mC . Cases 2 and 3 being symmetric, the proof
for case 3 is analogous to the one for case 2.
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Osborne, M. (1995): “Spatial model of political competition: A survey,”
Canadian Journal of Economics, 28(2), 261–301.
Osborne, M., and C. Pitchik (1987): “Equilibrium in Hotelling’s Model
of Spatial Competition,” Econometrica, 55, 911–922.
Prescott, E. C., and M. Visscher (1977): “Sequential location among
firms with foresight,” Bell Journal of Economics, 8(2), 378–393.
Salop, S. C. (1979): “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods,”
Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 141–156.
Spiegel online (2003): “Charts nonstop, totgedudelt,” Der Spiegel,
November, 5.
Weltwoche (2005): “Nationale Einfalt,” Nr. 26, Juni, 30.
32
